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            EMPEDOCLES, ON NATURE I.273-87: PLACE, THE ELEMENTS 
AND STILL NO ‘WE’ 
 
SIMON TRÉPANIER 
 
Abstract. 
This article presents a new, complete edition of Empedocles, On Nature I.265-90, in 
particular lines I.273-87 or a (ii) 3-17 of the Strasburg papyrus of Empedocles, P. 
Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665-1666. The basis for the edition is two new supplements to 
section a (ii) grounded on doxographic testimony. These new supplements confirm 
that the passage is devoted to cosmology, specifically the relation between place and 
the elements. That in turn provides a reliable framework for a reconstruction of the 
remaining lines. More controversially, the reconstruction gives new grounds for 
rejecting the controversial variant reading συνερχόμεθα ‘we come together’ found in 
two or perhaps three instances in the papyrus.  If the content of the passage is 
consistently cosmological, these new variants must be no more than scribal errors. 
 
Keywords: Empedocles, elements, cosmic cycle, natural places, doxography. 
  
This study proposes a new and full reconstruction of the text of Empedocles’ 
On Nature I.273-87 or section a (ii) 3-17 of the Strasburg papyrus of Empedocles. 1 
                                                        
1 Martin and Primavesi 1999, henceforth M-P. References to the Empedoclean corpus 
follow the standard numbering from Diels and Kranz 1934; when cited, the text of 
doxographical material has been compared with Mansfeld and Runia 2009. In 
chronological order, the publications known to me, whether full editions or 
contributions to the text of papyrus, but excluding most reviews, are the following: 
 2 
The lines are not the worst preserved section of the papyrus, but are more difficult to 
reconstruct than others for lack of either an overlap with known fragments or, until 
now, any conclusive indicators of their content. What Empedocles says in these lines, 
I will argue, is that except when they are subsumed into ‘one’, or the Sphairos-god, 
the four elements are always scattered and on the move. More precisely, from cycle 
to cycle their position in the world is not fixed to any particular level or location.   
 
1. TWO NEW TEXTUAL SUPPLEMENTS 
 
Location and continuity of I.232-291; Simplicius’ partial quotation  
 Lines I.273-87 follow upon or, as I would have it, continue the general 
exposition of the cycle begun at I.232.2  A sure terminus for the whole section is 
                                                                                                                                                              
Osborne 2000, Algra and Mansfeld 2001, Curd 2001, A. Laks 2002, Janko 2004, 
Pierris 2005, Inwood, 2006; Vítek, 2006, Mansfeld and Algra 2008, Primavesi 2008, 
Primavesi 2011, Gemelli Marciano 2013. This edition supersedes Trépanier 2003. 
2 = DK B 17 and its continuation. Thanks to a stichometric mark indicating that that 
line a (ii) 30 was line 300 of the roll, and Simplicius’ identification of B 17 as from 
Book I of the Physics or On Nature, we have the absolute position of these lines, see 
M-P p. 103-111. I follow DK by including line B 17.9/I.240 (imported from B 26.8), 
which Simplicius’ citation of B 17 omits, so that my numbering runs from 232. Of 
subsequent publications, perhaps the most significant is Richard Janko's 2004 case 
for positioning the two larger sections c and d (and two smaller sections b and f) 
whose position M-P left open, as the immediate column-sequels to the longer 
continuous section formed by B 17 plus sections a (i) and a (ii). Τhat allows Janko to 
propose an extended sequence from line B17.1/I.233 all the way down to I.364, with 
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I.291 where we have a ten-line transitional passage, in which Empedocles announces 
to the hearer a transition to what we would call biology, or as he puts it, ‘the coming-
together and unfolding of life’ (1.294 and 300).  
The text of I.232 to I.273 is mostly secure, based upon fragment B 17 from 
Simplicius (=I.232-67), plus four lines known from Aristotle (I.269-72 = Metaphys. 
B 4. 1000a29), but the papyrus is our only witness to lines I.267-8 which bridge the 
gap between the two witnesses. Based on the length of Simplicius’ 35-line quotation 
at In phys. 157 25 ff., we can be relatively confident that B 17/I.232-67 was the main 
or fullest exposition of the doctrine of the cosmic cycle in the work. But does 
Simplicius’ quotation reproduce the integrity of the original Empedoclean section on 
the cycle?  
It is a comforting assumption to think that the original section ends where 
Simplicius leaves off, but there is in fact no reason to exclude the alternative. If we 
look for evidence of transition to a new topic, then as we will see below, there is none. 
On the contrary, all of the fully extant verbs over the lines in question are in the 
present tense. In an Empedoclean cyclical universe, this will be the tense used to 
describe general conditions, truths and facts. More modestly, it is simply the same 
tense as in preceding lines devoted to the description of the cycle. The reconstructed 
text therefore can also serve to confirm its prior working assumption that the whole 
sequence from I.232 to 291, including the debated lines, functions as a single 
expository unit.  
                                                                                                                                                              
some gaps. It is too early to tell if Janko’s reconstruction will become the standard 
view; Primavesi, for instance, in 2008 and 2011, accepts Janko’s positioning of c, but 
not of d. The question has no bearing on the present study, whose scope is limited to 
On Nature I.273-87.  
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If that is true, however, one immediate consequence of it is that Simplicius’ 
quotation of B 17 will thereby be shown to be only a partial account of the cycle. 
Does that mean that Simplicius misrepresents Empedocles? Not necessarily. 
Simplicius’ reason for quoting On Nature I.232-67 is to illustrate Aristotle’s 
reference to Anaxagoras and Empedocles as thinkers who include both ‘the one and 
the many’ in their physical theories (Physics 187a21). After first quoting Anaxagoras 
at some length, Simplicius quotes Empedocles DK B 17/On Nature I.232-67 to 
display the alternation of ‘the one and the many’ and to identify his six first 
principles. But Simplicius does not include the entire section intended by Empedocles, 
because at that point in his commentary on the Physics the relation of place and the 
elements in the Empedoclean cosmos has no bearing on Aristotle’s remarks. By 
contrast, and still assuming that lines I.232-90 form a single expository unit, it is 
possible to see why Empedocles himself has good reason to discuss this topic at 
exactly this point. His reason is that the notion of a cosmic cycle, taken on its own, 
might easily lead the hearer to imagine that the cycle is a series of identical iterations. 
But the evidence is clear that the Empedoclean cycle reserves, at least in its cosmic 
phases, a role for chance. That is to say, when Strife breaks apart the unity of the 
Sphairos-god, the elements always go their separate ways, but they do not always end 
up in the same places either within one cosmos, or from one cosmos to the next; 
rather, they move at random (references in note 7). This Empedoclean 
disambiguation, I will now argue, is the point of I.273-87. 
 
Two new Supplements 
 The two new textual anchors for my reconstruction are lines I.279 (= a (ii) 9) 
and I.284 (= a (ii) 14). Other supplements are as in M-P, unless noted. 
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I.279 (= a (ii) 9) The preserved section offers [οὔ]τε γὰρ ἠέλιος τ[ . . ] . ν . So far, the 
only suggestion for the rest of the line is Primavesi 2011: [οὔ]τε γὰρ ἠέλιος Τ[ιτ]ὴν̣ 
ο[̣ὔτ’ ἄπλετος αἰ θήρ]. But a more obvious possibility is that the missing next word is 
τ[όπ]ον̣. The best parallels for this are, first, I.286, 7 lines down, where the secure 
portions of the text mention elemental ‘wandering’ and ‘places’ τό̣πους 
πλαγ[χθέντα; second, line 15 of section d of the papyrus, possibly no more than two 
30-line columns later according to Janko, has  . . ] τόπον ἐσχάτιο[ν . ]ην where the 
‘furthestmost place’ is connected to fire ascending from the earth. Reinforcing the 
likelihood of τ[όπ]ον̣ is that the next letter shows clear traces of the left part of a 
curved letter, ε θ ο ω ϲ etc. so that it becomes reasonably certain that we can restore 
two words here:  [οὔ]τε γὰρ ἠέλιος τ[όπ]ον̣ ἐ ̣[σχάτον (the more standard spelling, as 
in B 36) or ἐ[̣σχάτιον as in d 15. Finally, such a connection between the sun and the 
outer limits of the world is clearly expressed in doxographical testimony A 49: Ἐ. τὸν 
τοῦ ἡλίου περίδρομον εἶ ναι περιγραφὴν τοῦ πέρατος τοῦ κόσμου. ‘Empedocles 
[says] that the circuit of the sun is an outline of the limit of the cosmos.’ 
 When we combine that with 1.278 (easily supplemented in combination with 
1.273), we can reconstruct a coherent three-line statement: 
 
a (ii) 8/I.278            [πά]ντῆι δ’ἀΐσσον̣[̣τ]α ̣διαμ[περὲς οὐδαμά λήγει.] 
a (ii) 9/I.279            [οὔ]τε γὰρ ἠέλιος τ[όπ]ον̣ ἐ ̣[σχάτον ἀμφιπολεύων] 
a (ii) 10/I.280          [ὁρ]μῆ⟨ ι⟩  τῆιδέ γε μοῦ̣[̣νον ἀναΐσσει περὶ  κύκλον (?)] 
 
and never do they stop soaring every which way through and through. 
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For neither does the sun, revolving around the outermost place, 
by that very motion soar only up around its circuit …  
 
For the last part of I.279, I suggest τ[όπ]ον̣ ἐ ̣[σχάτον ἀμφιπολεύων, cf. B 41, of the 
sun ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἁλισθεὶ ς μέγαν οὐρανὸν ἀμφιπολεύει. At I.280 the opening reads 
[. . ]μη τηιδε γε μ . .  M-P tentatively suggested [ὁρ]μή τῆιδέ γέμου̣[̣σα, Janko 
[ὁρ]μῆ⟨ ι⟩  τῆιδέ γέμου̣[̣σα with the moon supplied in I.279 as subject of the feminine 
participle. More recently, Primavesi 2011 has [ὁρ]μῆ⟨ ι⟩  τῆιδέ γέμον̣[̣τε, in which fire 
or the sun and αἰ θήρ are not now “beide von diesem Drang erfüllt...” Both options 
are now made less plausible by τ[όπ]ον̣ ἐ ̣[σχάτον. In the context of a discussion of 
movement (I.278) it seems better to restore γε μοῦ̣[̣νον or perhaps τῆιδέ γε μοῦ̣[̣νον 
together as an adverbial phrase denying that the sun moves only one way, either up or 
to the outer perimeter.3 That, we recall, is the actual the point Empedocles is making: 
                                                        
3 For μοῦνον as an adverb, compare a (ii) 21/ Ι. 291 [Σπεῦ]δε̣ δ’ὅπως μὴ μοῦνον ἀν’ 
οὔατα [μῦθος ἵ κεται]. Other instances are B 134.4 φρὴν ἱ ερή... ἔπλετο μοῦνον and 
(with μόνον) B 2.5 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες. For τῆι δέ cf. B 61. Another possibility 
is that the missing iota hints at a lost verb, ὁρμᾷ ‘rushes.’ e.g. [ὁρ]μ⟨ᾶι⟩  τῆιδέ γε 
μοῦ̣[̣νον ‘nor does the sun…/ rush only in this way…’ The coordinated syntax of 
I.281 [οὔ]τε τι τῶν ἄλλων would also be slightly smoother, while rarity of the verb 
can explain why the missing iota was dropped: it and the alpha were lost by 
assimilation to a more common noun. So perhaps: [ὁρ]μ⟨ᾶι⟩  τῆιδέ γε μοῦ̣[̣νον ἀν’ 
ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου with the second half of the line supplied from B 35.10 τῶν 
πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου. Compare A 49 quoted above and 
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the elements move in all directions, [πά]ντῆι δ’ἀΐσσον̣[̣τ]α.̣ Nevertheless, we are still 
short a main verb. Based on the negation [οὔ]τε ... μοῦ̣[̣νον I suggest ἀναΐσσει 
‘springs up’, that is, rises, the verb itself picking up on ἀΐσσον[τ]α. What point then is 
Empedocles making?  In order to support the claim that an element can travel in any 
direction, he invokes the sun’s daily motion through the sky as a quasi-rhetorical 
question. In its daily motion, ἀμφιπολεύων and [ὁρ]μῆ⟨ ι⟩  τῆιδέ, the sun, that is the 
element fire, does not only rise. As all hearers knew, it also sets. Thus the sun, that is 
fire, travels in (at least) two directions.4 The next lines, though poorly preserved, then 
appear to generalize this denial of ‘uni-directionality’ to the other elements. For now, 
however, if we also follow Janko in postulating a missing iota adscript and thereby 
take [ὁρ]μή in the dative, we can construe it with τῆιδέ, and reconstruct the line as 
above.  
 
I. 284 (=a (ii) 14). This line is best considered along with the two preceding verses.  
 
a (ii) 12/I.282          [ἀλ]λὰ̣ ̣μεταλλάσσον[̣τα . . . . ]εῖ̣ ̣κύκλωι [              ] 
                                                                                                                                                              
Parmenides B 11 πῶς γαῖ α καὶ  ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη/ αἰ θήρ τε ξυνὸς γάλα τ’ οὐράνιον 
καὶ  ὄλυμπος/ ἔσχατος ἠδ’ ἄστρων θερμὸν μένος ὡρμήθησαν/ γίγνεσθαι.  
4 Space prohibits exploring the problems related to the double or reflected sun, see 
DK A 30 and 56-8 = Graham 2010, no. 61-64 and 77, where one does find the phrase 
ὁρμή ἡλί ου. More likely Empedocles at this stage is arguing based only upon the 
visible daily rising and setting of the sun. The visible or reflected sun does not 
include all the available cosmic fire, see B 52 ‘many fires burn beneath the surface of 
the earth’.  
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a (ii) 13/I.283          [ . . . . ]τε μὲν γὰρ γαῖ [ . . . ]άτ̣η θέει ἠέλ[̣                 ]   
a (ii) 14/I.284          [ . . . . . ]τος, ἣν δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι τ[             ] 
 
 
The first line describes how the elements exchange or take turns in the cycle, which 
Empedocles then proceeds to illustrate in the next lines by discussing the sun, ἠέλ[̣ , 
and earth, γαῖ [α. The earth is said (sometimes ?) to run but the sun’s function in the 
line must be reconstructed. In the passage above, however, we have seen that fire or 
the sun was associated with the furthest or topmost place. The choice of the earth 
‘running’ here must be offering a contrast of some kind, since the earth is usually 
associated with immobility and the lowest regions, e.g. Xenophanes B 30. It seems 
likely, therefore, that the passage is related to Empedocles’ denial of natural places, 
for which the doxographic evidence is unambiguous, DK A 35 (Aëtius II 7, 6 Diels/ 
II. 7.7 Mansfeld-Runia):    
 
Ἐ. ἔλεγε μὴ διὰ παντὸς ἑστῶτας εἶ ναι μηδ’ ὡρισμένους τοὺς τόπους τῶν 
στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τοὺς ἀλλήλων μεταλαμβάνειν. 
 
Empedocles (declares that) the locations of the elements are not completely 
fixed or determined, but (they) all share in the locations of each other.   
(transl. Mansfeld-Runia) 
 
Achilles. Introduction to Aratus. p. 13.12-14 Di Maria. ὁ δὲ Ἐ. οὐ δίδωσι τοῖ ς 
στοιχείοις ὡρισμένους τόπους, ἀλλ’ ἀντιπαραχωρεῖ ν ἀλλήλοις φησίν, ὥστε 
τὴν γῆν μετέωρον φέρεσθαι καὶ  τὸ πῦρ ταπεινότερον.  
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Empedocles does not assign defined locations to the elements, but says that 
they give way to one another, so that the earth is carried up on high and fire 
down below.  
 
Based on those testimonies, in Trépanier 2003 I suggested γαῖ (α) [ὑπ]άτη θέει 
ἠελ[̣ίοιο] ‘earth runs uppermost of the sun’.5 As stated above, I still think that that is 
the right idea. It can be improved upon, however: 
 
a (ii) 12/I.282          [ἀλ]λὰ̣ ̣μεταλλάσσον[̣τα κρατ]εῖ̣ ̣κύκλωι [τάδ’ ἕκαστα.] 6 
a (ii) 13/I.283          [καὶ  πο]τὲ μὲν γὰρ γαῖ (α)̣ [ὑπ]άτ̣η θέει ἠέλ[̣ιός τε]   
a (ii) 14/I.284          [νέρτα]τος, ἣν δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι τ[άξιν ἔχουσι.] 
 
but alternating one after another each of these dominates in a cycle 
For sometimes even the earth runs uppermost, and the sun 
nethermost, a ranking which even now among men they hold. 
 
The inverted positions of earth and fire match exactly the description from Achilles, 
while the idea that the elements can occupy any level is confirmed from a number of 
                                                        
5 See Primavesi 2008 for some criticisms. On ὕπατος see LSJ, s.v. II. The most direct 
parallel is Aeschylus, Agamemnon τρόπον αἰ γυπιῶν οἵ τ’ ἐκπατίοις/ ἄλγεσι παίδων 
ὕπατοι λεχέων/ (50) στροφοδινοῦνται/ πτερύγων ἐρετμοῖ σιν ἐρεσσόμενοι. For a 
defense of the reading, Denniston and Page 1957, 72.  
6 M-P [ἀλ]λὰ̣ ̣μεταλλάσσον[̣τ’ ἀΐσσ]εῖ ̣κ̣ύκλωι [ἁπάντηι. See the app. crit. in part 2. 
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other fragments and from Aristotle, Plutarch and Philoponus.7 The notion of surprise, 
moreover, is what leads me to suggest [καὶ  πο]τὲ μὲν, with the surprise underlined 
by the emphatic μέν solitarium. For νέρτα]τος compare DK B 35.3-4 ἐπεὶ  Νεῖ κος 
μὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵ κετο βένθος / δίνης. 8 The element of surprise shows that 
                                                        
7 See B 53 quoted below and B 54, both from Aristotle, and B 52 from Proclus. 
Plutarch De facie 927f, source of B 76. On chance, see B 103 and B 104 with 
Simplicius’ comment, Phys. 331, 10 For chance in biology, compare also B 75 or B 
85. Clearest is John Philoponus in Aristotelis Physica (=CAG XVI-XVII) 261.17-25  
‘Empedocles at any rate says that the air obtained the upper place by chance. For all 
things being previously mixed together in the Sphairos, then separated by Strife, each 
one was carried to the place in which it now is not by any providence, but as it so 
happened. At least, he says about air’s upward motion, “thus it so happened to be 
running then, at other times otherwise” (B 53). For at present water is atop the earth, 
but at another time, if it so happened in another cosmogony, when the cosmos once 
more comes to be from the Sphairos, it would obtain another ranking and location 
(ἄλλην τινὰ τάξιν καὶ  τόπον ἀπολαβεῖ ν).’  
8 The alternative reconstruction with [ἄλλο]τε μὲν γὰρ γαῖ (α) [ἀβ]άτ̣η ἠελ[̣ίου τε in 
line 283 and [σφαῖ ρα] τόσην δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι τ[ιέμεν ἐστίν] in 284 
(Primavesi 2011) both make sense separately, but together produce nonsense. For the 
converse implication of [ἄλλο]τε  or  [δὴ τό]τε construed with the next line is that 
there are times when the sphere of the sun runs (and is trod upon ?). But the sun runs 
now, so what point is being made? In any case, σφαῖ ρα for ‘sphere of the sun’ is 
completely unattested. It is never used of the sun in Empedocles or that I can tell in 
all of Presocratic philosophy, where the term always denotes the outer limit of the 
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Empedocles is not claiming that this arrangement holds now in general. Like the 
earth running, the statement is meant as a sort of provocation, to draw the hearer’s 
attention to how the claim is to be explained or unpacked. Notably, in ensemble b/ 
B76, most likely two and a half columns down, or c. 85 lines according to Janko 
2004, Empedocles offers a catalogue of animals with ‘earth’ or hard parts on top or 
the outside, such as conches and horned stags, and then turns to the hearer and 
declares b 2/ B 76.3 ἔνθ’ ὄψει χθόνα χρωτὸς ὑπέρτατα ναιετάουσαν, ‘whence you 
will see earth dwelling atop of flesh’. Line 284, therefore, may look ahead to a 
passage in which Empedocles used examples from the diversity of relative elemental 
locations found in (microcosmic) animals and plants to claim that the elements have 
no inherent dispositions to take up specific macrocosmic locations in the cosmos. So 
perhaps here one could also restore ἣν δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι τ[άξιν δείξω] ‘a 
ranking which, even now, among men, I will point out.’ 
 
2. EMPEDOCLES, ON NATURE I. 265-90  
 Thanks to those two passages, we are in a position to attempt a reconstruction 
of the lines I.273-87. For context and other reasons given below, the text includes all 
of lines I.265 to 290. The text and apparatus give the papyrological data, main 
alternative supplements and parallels. Issues requiring more evidence or longer 
discussion are taken up as needed in a series of notes keyed to specific lines.  
 
I.265 (B 17.34)   ⌊ἀλλ’ αὐτ(ὰ) ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων⌋  δὲ θέοντα                            
                                                                                                                                                              
heaven; see the indices in Vítek (2006) and DK vol. 3; in Empedocles κύκλος is used 
of the sun at Β 47.   
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I.266 (B 17.35)   ⌊γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ  ἠνεκὲ⌋ς αἰ ὲν ὁμοῖ α,   
I.267                    [ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχό]μεν’ εἰ ς ἕνα κόσ̣μον   
I.268                    [ἄλλοτε δ’αὖ διαφύντα Κότωι πλέ]ον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶ ναι,  
I.269                    ⌊ἐξ ὧν πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔσθ’ ὅ⌋σα τ’ ἔσσετ’ ὀπίσ̣σω  
I.270                    ⌊δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ  ἀνέρες⌋  ἠδὲ γυναῖ κες 
I.271                    ⌊θ⌋ῆρές τ’ οἰ ωνοί̣ ̣⌊τε καὶ ⌋  ὑδατοθρέ⌊μμονες ἰ χθῦς⌋   
I.272                    ⌊κ⌋αί τε θεοὶ  δολιχα⌊ ίων⌋ες τιμῆισ⌊ ι φέριστοι.  
I.273                    [πά]ντῆι δ’ἀΐσσοντα [διαμπ]ερ̣ὲς οὐδ[αμά λήγει,] 
I.274                    [π]υκ̣νῆισιν δίνησ[̣ι μεταλλάσσον]τα ̣[κελεύθους]                               
I.275                    [ν]ωλ̣ε̣μές, οὐδέ πο[τ’ αὐτὰ τόπους πλαγχθέντ’ ἀπολήγει (?)] 
I.276                    [πολλ]οὶ  δ’ αἰ ῶνες πρ̣ότερ[ον τετελεσμένοι εἶ σι]                                 
I.277                   [πρίν] το̣ύτων μετα̣βῆνα[̣ι ἐς ἕν μόνον εἶ ναι ἔνερθε,]  
I.278                   [πά]ντῆι δ’ἀΐσσον̣[̣τ]α ̣διαμ[περὲς οὐδαμά λήγει.]  
I.279                   [οὔ]τε γὰρ ἠέλιος τ[όπ]ον̣ ἐ ̣[σχάτον ἀμφιπολεύων]  
I.280                   [ὁρ]μῆ⟨ ι⟩  τῆιδέ γε μοῦ̣[̣νον ἀναΐσσει περὶ  κύκλον (?)]  
I.281                   [οὔ]τε τι τῶν ἄλλων [νῦν νέρτατα ναιετάοντων (?)]  
I.282                   [ἀλ]λὰ̣ ̣μεταλλάσσον[̣τα κρατ]εῖ̣ ̣κύκλωι [τάδ’ ἕκαστα.]  
I.283                   [καὶ  πο]τὲ μὲν γὰρ γαῖ (α)̣ [ὑπ]άτ̣η θέει ἠέλ[̣ιός τε]  
I.284                   [νέρτα]τος, ἣν δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι τ[άξιν ἔχουσι.]  
I.285                   [ὣς δ’α]ὔτ̣ως τάδ[ε π]άντα δι’ἀλλήλων [προθέουσι]  
I.286                   [εἰ ς ἄλλο]υς τ(ε) ἄλλ[ους] τε̣ ̣τό̣πους πλαγ[χθέντα δίχ’ αὐτά] 
I.287                   [εἶ τ’ αὖ εἰ ς] με̣σ̣άτούς τ[̣⟨ε⟩  συνε]ρχ̣όμεν’ ἕν μ[̣όνον εἶ ναι.]  
I.288                    [Ἀλλ’ ὄτ]ε ̣δὴ Νεῖ κος [μὲν ὑπ]ερβατὰ βέν[θε’ ἵ κηται]  
I.289                   δ[ίν]ης, ἐν δὲ μέσ[ηι] Φιλότης στροφά[λιγγι γένηται,]   
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I.290                   ἐν τῆι δὴ τάδε πάν ̣τα συνέρχεται ἓν [μόνον εἶ ναι.]  
 
Full references are in note 1. Unless noted, supplements are as in M-P. The apparatus 
does not aim to be exhaustive. For fuller details on textual variants in the indirect 
tradition (Aristotle and Simplicius), see Janko 2004. Abbreviations of frequently 
cited editions: M-P; T 2003 = Trépanier 2003; Janko = Janko 2004; Primavesi =  
Primavesi 2008; Graham 2010; Primavesi 2011; GM = Gemelli Marciano 2013.  
 
I.265 δὲ θέοντα Simplicius    γε̣  θέοντα papyrus     I.267  [ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι 
scripsi     [ἄλλ’ ἐν μὲν (?) M-P Janko GM    συνερχό]μεθ’ 1st hand, συνερχό]μεν’ 2nd 
hand.; συνερχό]μεθ’  M-P, Laks 2002, Inwood 2001, Janko, Primavesi;  
συνερχό]μεν’ Algra-Mansfeld 2001, T 2003, Pierris, Vítek 2006, Mansfeld-Algra 
2008, Graham 2010, GM, cf. B. 26.5 ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰ ς ἕνα 
κόσμον    ενα 1st hand supralinear correction of ενε     I.268 [ἄλλοτε δ’αὖ διαφύντα 
Κότωι  scripsi, cf. B 26.7 ἓν συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν and B 26. 9 ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος 
ἑνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι     for Κότωι cf. B 21.7 ἐν δὲ Κότωι διάμορφα καὶ  ἄνδιχα 
πάντα πέλονται     [ἐν δ’ Ἔχθρηι γε πάλιν διέφυ(?) πλέ]ον’ M-P, Janko, GM      
I.269-71 = Aristotle Metaphys. B 4. 1000a29-32.   Ι.269  ὅσσα τ’ ἔσσετ’ 1st hand, ὅσα  
2nd hand (supralinear dot)  ἔσσετ’ papyrus;  ἔσται Aristotle. The participle construal 
of I.267-8 makes a single sentence out of I.265-72, where the joint activity of Love 
and Strife produces plants, animals and gods, see I.294 and I.300.     I.273  [ἐ]ν τῆι  
M-P, Janko, Primavesi, Graham; [πά]ντῆι T 2003, Vítek 2006, GM 2013. The space 
requires two letters, cf. I.274 [π]υκ̣νῆισι     I.274  μεταλλάσσον]τα ̣[κελεύθους] 
scripsi, cf. B 115.8 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους on the wandering 
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δαίμωνες; B 35.14 διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους of the elements changing from unmixed 
to mixture, both in the same sedes; cf. also B 17.12/B 26.10. Space favours μετα- 
over δια-  but both are possible, if delta had a wide base.     I.275-7 scripsi  I.275 οὐδέ 
πο[τ’ αὐτὰ τόπους πλαγχθέντ’ ἀπολήγει] cf. 1.286 τό̣πους πλαγ[χθέντα     
[ἀπολήγει cf. B 17.30      I.276 or π ̣ρότερ[οι or π ̣ρότερ[ω τετελεσμένοι εἶ σι cf. B 
30.2-3 τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο,/ ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖ ος πλατέος παρ’ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου; 
Iliad 1.212 τετελεσμένον ἔσται, 14.196 etc. (x 8); τετελεσμένον ἐστίν, Odyssey 
5.90 (x 2); Hesiod, Theogony 795 τετελεσμένον εἰ ς ἐνιαυτὸν (on the exile of the 
banished god); Parmenides B 8.42, of Being, τετελεσμένον ἐστί.     I.277 cf. B 26.10 
εἰ σόκεν ἓν συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται     I.278 cf. I. 273 [πά]ντῆι all edd. 
but [ἐ]ν τῆι Graham   I.279 scripsi cf. d 15 . . ] τόπον ἐσχάτιο[ν . ]ην      
ἀμφιπολεύων cf. B 41 on the sun, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἁλισθεὶ ς μέγαν οὐρανὸν ἀμφιπολεύει     
[οὔ]τε γὰρ ἠέλιος Τ[ιτ]ὴν̣ ο[̣ὔτ’ ἄπλετος αἰ θήρ]  Primavesi 2011     I.280 μοῦ̣[̣νον 
ἀναΐσσει περὶ  κύκλον] scripsi. For μοῦνον, a (ii) 21/ Ι. 291 [Σπεῦ]δε̣ δ’ὅπως μὴ 
μοῦνον ἀν’ οὔατα [μῦθος ἵ κεται]; for ἀναΐσσει, cf. I.273, I. 278 and B.100.6-7 ἔνθεν 
ἔπειθ’ ὁπόταν μὲν ἀπαΐξηι τέρεν αἷ μα/ αἰ θὴρ παφλάζων καταΐσσεται οἴ δματι 
μάργωι ; for περὶ  κύκλον, cf. B 38.4 Τιτὰν ἠδ᾽  αἰ θήρ σφί γγων περὶ  κύκλον 
ἅπαντα    or perhaps [ὁρ]μ⟨ᾶι⟩  τῆιδέ γε μοῦ̣[̣νον ἀν’ ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου, cf. B 
35.10 τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου  and A 49   [ὁρ(?)]μή τῆιδέ 
γέμου̣[̣σα  M-P: [ὁρ]μῆ⟨ ι⟩  τῆιδέ γέμου̣[̣σα Janko [ὁρ]μῆ⟨ ι⟩  τῆιδέ γέμον̣[̣τε 
Primavesi 2011     I.281 [νῦν νέρτατα ναιετάοντων (?)]  scripsi cf. b 2/ B 76.3 ἔνθ’ 
ὄψει χθόνα χρωτὸς ὑπέρτατα ναιετάουσαν; B 112.2 ναίετ᾽  ἀν᾽  ἄκρα πόλεος  
perhaps [οὔ]τε τι τῶν ἄλλων [ὅσα νῦν ἐσορῶμεν ἅπαντα] cf. B 38.2 ἐξ ὧν δῆλ’ 
ἐγένοντο τὰ νῦν ἐσορῶμεν ἅπαντα [μένει ἔμπεδον οὐρανῶι ἄστρων] Janko     I. 282  
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after T 2003, except [ἁπάντα, cf. Β 17.29 ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο 
χρόνοιο. For the middle gap, pace Primavesi 2008, there is space for 5-6 letters. 
Metrical advantages: 1) restores third-foot feminine caesura 2) avoids licit but 
unusual short in ω of κύκλωι.     [ἀλ]λὰ̣ ̣μεταλλάσσον[̣τ’ ἀΐσσ]εῖ ̣κ̣ύκλωι [ἁπάντηι  
M-P GM    [ἁπάντα, Janko     I.283 [καὶ  πο]τὲ μὲν γὰρ γαῖ (α)̣ [ὑπ]άτ̣η θέει ἠέλ[̣ιός 
τε] scripsi cf. Achilles. Introduction to Aratus. P. 13.12-14 Di Maria, cited above.  
For the μέν solitarium, see B 62.4 and possibly B 134.2 (a modern supplement)  [δὴ 
τό]τε μὲν γὰρ γαῖ (α) [ἀβ]άτ̣η θέει ἠέλ[̣ιός τε] M-P GM  Janko [ἀβ]άτ̣η G. Most in 
M-P [ἄλλο]τε μὲν γὰρ  Primavesi     γαῖ (α) [ὑπ]άτη θέει ἠελ[̣ίοιο] T 2003     ἠέλ ̣[ιού 
τε]/ [σφαῖ ρα]  Janko, Primavesi, Graham GM    I.284 [νέρτα]τος scripsi cf. B 35.3-
4 ἐπεὶ  Νεῖ κος μὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵ κετο βένθος / δίνης     τ[άξιν scripsi cf. Philoponus 
in Aristotelis Physica (CAG XVI-XVII) 261.17-25, quoted above. Perhaps τ[άξιν 
δεί ξω.]      [σφαῖ ρα,] τόσην δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι  τ[εκμήρασθαι M-P, Janko 
GM       ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι τ[ιέμεν ἐστίν]  Primavesi 2011     I.285  [θέει αἰ εί] T 2003 
Vítek 2006     [προθέουσι] Janko      [γε δραμόντα] Primavesi      I.286  [εἰ ς 
ἄλλο]υς scripsi     [κἄλλο]υς M-P Janko GM    ἄλλ[α ἵ κα]νε̣ ̣ M-P Janko   ἄλλ[οτε 
ἄλ]λα̣ ̣ T 2003    ἄλλ’ [ἔσχη]κε̣ ̣Primavesi 2011    πλαγ[χθέντ’ ἱ δί ους τε]  M-P, 
Primavesi 2008, 2011  πλαγ[χθέντα καὶ  ἄλλους] Janko  I.287  [εἶ τ’ αὖ εἰ ς] scripsi     
με̣σ̣ατους 1st hand supra lineam corr. of με̣τ̣ατους      με̣σ̣άτούς τ ̣[ . . . . ]ρχ̣όμεθ     τ 
[̣⟨ε⟩  συνε]ρχ̣όμεν’ scripsi, cf. Algra-Mansfeld 2001, Pierris, Vítek 2006 Mansfeld-
Algra 2008; perhaps τ ̣[⟨ὰ⟩  συνε]ρχ̣όμεν’    τ ̣[ε συνε]ρχ̣όμεν’  T 2003     [οὔ τοι δή] 
με̣σ̣άτούς τ ̣[’ εἰ σε]ρχ̣όμεθ’ ἕν μ[̣όνον εἶ ναι.]  Janko     [οὐ δή πω] με̣σ̣άτους τ[̣ι 
ἐσε]ρχ̣όμεθ’ ἕν μ[̣όνον εἶ ναι.] Primavesi 2008     I.288  Νεῖ κος [μὲν ὑπ]έρβατα 
βέν[θε’ ἵ κηται] M-P     [τ’ ἀνυπ]έρβατα Pierris Janko Primavesi 
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I.265                    But these are the same, yet racing through each other, 
they become different at different times and always alike, 
at one time through Love coming together into one order,   
at another in turn grown apart through Hate to be more, from one, 
from which all things that ever were, are, or will be hereafter     
I.270                    have sprouted up: trees and men and women    
and wild beasts and birds and fishes reared in water 
and even gods of long life, mightiest in their privileges. 
And never do they cease rushing from end to end in all directions, 
exchanging paths in tight-packed eddies 
I.275                    without rest, nor do they ever cease wandering from place to place.  
But many ages are first brought to completion, 
before they migrate from these to become one alone, down below, 
and never do they cease rushing from end to end in all directions. 
For neither does the sun, revolving around the outermost place, 
I.280                    by that very motion only rise around its circuit,         
no more than any of the others now dwelling deepest, 
but alternating one after another, each of them dominates in turn. 
For sometimes even earth runs uppermost, and sun 
nethermost, a ranking which even now among men they hold. 
I.285                    And just so do all of these race through one another:         
both wandering from place to place each separately, 
and then in turn coming together in the middle [places] to be one alone. 
But when Strife has reached the uttermost depths  
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of the whirl, and Love comes to be in the centre of the maelstrom, 
I.290                    in her then do all of these come together to be one alone.        
 
Lines I.273-77 
The most difficult section to reconstruct is lines I.273-77. Accordingly, the 
text I offer does not pretend to be definitive in all details. Still, the reconstruction 
does aim to reflect what Empedocles said, even if we cannot be certain of the exact 
manner in which he said it. The reasons for this are, first, that we now can be 
confident of the topic: the random relation between place and the elements during 
cosmic phases. Second, and following from that, we now have a criterion for 
selecting parallels. Of these, I suggest that the most potent is DK B 26, which 
Simplicius tell us followed B 17 in Book I, albeit not immediately, and whose 
language indicates that it is a recap of our passage:  
   
  ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο κύκλοιο, 
  καὶ  φθίνει εἰ ς ἄλληλα καὶ  αὔξεται ἐν μέρει αἴ σης.  
  αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα  
  γίνοντ(αι) ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ  ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν 
5     ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰ ς ἕνα κόσμον, 
  ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορούμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει, 
  εἰ σόκεν ἓν συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται. 
  οὕτως ἧι μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι 
  ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι, 
10   τῆι μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ  οὔ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰ ών· 
  ἧι δὲ τάδ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, 
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  ταύτηι δ’ αἰ ὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.9 
 
Beyond smaller textual points, B 26 can help with two interpretative issues. First, as 
others have noted, the context in which the phrase Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰ ς ἕνα 
κόσμον occurs at B 26.5, (in the participial form, see below), shows that the word 
κόσμος at I.267 can include a microcosmic sense, as a description of an individual 
mixture or biological entity.10 Second and more significant is line B 26.7 εἰ σόκεν ἓν 
συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται ‘until the all becomes one, grown together down 
below.’ This description makes plain how the advent of the Sphairos-god in the 
                                                        
9 ‘And in turn they predominate in the revolution of time/ and die into one another 
and are increased by a turn of fate./ For these are the same, but running through each 
other/ they become men and tribes of other beasts,/ (5) at one time through Love 
coming together into one order (κόσμος) / at another in turn each of them carried 
apart through the hatred of Strife/ until the all becomes one, grown together down 
below./ Thus, in that it has learned to grow into one from many/ and that, the one 
growing back apart, the many come to be/ (10) in this way they come to be and their 
span is not secure./ But in that they never cease continually changing/ in this way 
they always are, fixed in the cycle.’ On the position of the passage, Simplicius 
reports, in Phys. 33.4-17, that B 26 followed B 21 at a small interval, but at in Phys. 
159.10 that B 17 and B 21 are separated by a fair sized gap; on the text of B 26 in 
relation to B 17, see O’Brien, 1969, 323-4, who plausibly suggests adding both of B 
26.7-8 to B 17. 
10 Von Armin 1902 p. 26-7, Hölsher 1965, Stokes 1971 p. 167. Contra Hölsher on the 
macrocosmic reading, see O’Brien 2000. 
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macrocosmic alternation of ‘one and many’ puts an end to the microcosmic or 
biological alternation of the same: without Strife to hold them apart, Love ‘subsumes’ 
all the elements into one, or draws them down into the centre, so that no separate 
entities can exist, cf. I. 287. The point of ὑπένερθε at B 26.7 as a literal description 
of place now becomes far more conspicuous.11 Based on it, I offer I.276-7 as an 
earlier and fuller version of B 26.7: 
 
a (ii) 6/I.276            [πολλ]οὶ  δ’ αἰ ῶνες πρ̣ότερ[ον τετελεσμένοι εἶ σι]  
a (ii) 7/ I.277           [πρίν] το̣ύτων μετα̣βῆνα[̣ι ἐς ἕν μόνον εἶ ναι ἔνερθε]   
 
 
The many aeons describe the duration of the cosmic phase(s) of the cycle, ending 
when the elements leave their constant whirls, πυκνῆισιν δίνησι and wanderings, 
τόπους πλαγχθέντα so as to return to a single central ‘home’, the Sphairos as the 
elements’ nostos. For τετελεσμένοι εἶ σι at I.276, compare B 30.2 τελειομένοιο 
χρόνοιο used to demarcate the end of the untroubled Sphairos and the return of Strife 
to activity.12 For line I.275, the preserved sections of I.286 suggests a plausible 
hexameter, mutatis mutandis. 
                                                        
11 Compare also B 35.9 where Strife in retreat holds the elements up, ὅσσ’ ἔτι Νεῖ κος 
ἔρυκε μετάρσιον. For discussion, Graham 2005. 
12 The Byzantine scholia to Aristotle that give chronological specifics about the cycle 
do so in terms of χρόνοι, see text in Graham 2010 no. 66 and  now Rashed 2014. 
Primavesi 2002, 198 first suggested that χρόνος renders the originally Empedoclean 
term αἰ ών. See Rashed 2001, 246, Primavesi 2006, Rashed 2014. In I.276, however, 
we get nothing more specific than [πολλ]οὶ  ‘many’.    
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 Working our way back from that, we can now consider lines I.273-5. At I.273 
the only point at issue is whether to restore the more obvious [πά]ντῆι, as in I.278, 
against ἐ]ν τῆι as advocated by M-P and Janko on the grounds that the left margin 
does not allow room for two letters. Against that I would counter that their general 
estimate of the left margin is about a half-letter too short (see also below on I.286-7). 
For now, the space for two letters is in any case insured by the certain [π]υκ̣νῆισιν in 
the next line.13 If so, then the passage shows no evidence of a major transition, and 
the δέ in [πά]ντῆι δ’ is merely resumptive. For I.274, the fact that the adverb 
[ν]ωλ̣ε̣μές is pushed into the next line supports the assumption of a long verb and 
noun combination in the previous line. Since the activity of the elements during 
cosmic phases involves fluctuation between mixtures and separation, we can 
supplement the line based on B 35.14 διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους which describes the 
elements changing from unmixed to mixture and B 115.8, ἀργαλέας βιότοιο 
μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους, where it applies to the wandering δαίμονες. (Here 
space marginally favours μεταλλάσσοντα.) This describes well the alternations 
undergone by the elements, see B 8.14 
 
                                                        
13 To what could ἐ]ν τῆι refer? M-P suggested Strife, restoring ἐν δ’ Ἔχθρηι at I.268, 
but since both Love and Strife are grammatically feminine, there would be no way of 
knowing which is meant.   
14 B 8.3-4 ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων /ἔστι, φύσις δ’ ἐπὶ  τοῖ ς 
ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. As Palmer 2009, 287-9 points out, its primary meaning 
comes from the field of exchange and reciprocity, so that διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων 
should also include among its meanings ‘exchange of things mixed.’ 
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Lines 285-7 
 The reconstruction of I.279-84 was undertaken in section 1, so it only remains 
to discuss I.285-7. The single most important question is whether or not we should 
accept the first hand’s ‘we’, which here was not corrected by the second hand, or if 
we can undertake to correct it based on the fact that the second hand corrected it in 
two other instances, I.267 and c 3. I chose to correct it, but since the ‘we’ cannot be 
discussed in isolation from its other instances, I postpone my full discussion of it to 
the next section. Two other non-negligible matters are the amount of space available 
1) on the left margin, and 2) in the middle gap of I.287 με̣σ̣άτούς τ[̣ . . . . ]ρχ̣όμεθ’. 
On 1) I find that the left margin is about a half-letter wider than allowed for by M-P, 
Janko and others (as above on line I.273). In most cases this is not enough to make a 
difference, but at lines I.286-7, I estimate the space available as more suited to 6 
letters.15 On 2) the space only allows for 4 letters. Thus, the space appears too short 
to accommodate the combination of the standard or better-attested form of the verb, 
συνερχόμεν(α), along with the second letter of a two-letter word starting with tau 
that preceded the verb. Taking that into account, I would nevertheless supplement the 
lines as follows: 
 
a (ii) 15/I.285          [ὣς δ’α]ὔτ̣ως τάδ[ε π]άντα δι’ἀλλήλων [προθέουσι] 
a (ii) 16/I.286          [εἰ ς ἄλλο]υς τ(ε) ἄλλ[ους] τε̣ ̣τό̣πους πλαγ[χθέντα δίχ’ αὐτά] 
a (ii) 17/I.287            [εἶ τ’ αὖ εἰ ς] με̣σ̣άτούς τ[̣⟨ε⟩  συνε]ρχ̣όμεν’ ἕν μ[̣όνον εἶ ναι.] 
 
                                                        
15 And counting the sequence ει as equivalent to one normal letter-space. No reader 
should take these claims at my word, but should consult the photographs or, if 
possible, the originals in Strasburg. My autopsy on June 20th 2013. 
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The formula ὣς δ’αὔτως introduces a summing-up of the previous cosmological 
discussion and the next two lines define the two opposed general types of elemental 
movements produced in the cycle: I.286 describes the scattering into different 
directions of the elements under Strife; I.287 their return to the centre under Love, cf. 
B 26.7 ὑπένερθε γένηται. All of the action, moreover, is accounted for using the 
timeless participial present. Not only that, but we can now note that the lines also 
function as another instance of an AB poetic pattern of alternation, albeit here BA, in 
which a line devoted to the activity of Love is paired with one describing the work of 
Strife (more on this below). The resulting statement is certainly simpler and clearer 
than the alternatives.  
Nevertheless, the text as reconstructed by Janko or Primavesi is the product of 
two defensible choices, even though I am arguing against them. The first is the 
decision not to correct the ‘we’, the second the fact that the gap in the middle of the 
line only allows for 4 of the 5 letters needed for με̣σ̣άτούς τ[̣⟨ε⟩  συνε]ρχ̣όμεν’. My 
text, therefore, trades consistency of subject matter and poetic regularity against an 
un-noted correction of συνερ]χόμεθ’ to συνερ]χόμεν’ (‘we’) and a conscious 
violation of ‘Youties’ law’, the positing of an error within an unverifiable lacuna. To 
some this will seem too strong a normalization, a rejection of the new simply because 
it challenges the old. But in favour of both corrections I offer four narrower 
considerations here, to be followed by a broader stylistic argument in part 3.  
First, and to my mind decisively, the alternative reconstructions of I.287 
simply cannot be made to yield good sense.16 Other defenders of the ‘we’ insist that 
                                                        
16 Janko and Primavesi’s translations lay bare the non-sequitur of their texts: Janko 
(2004): ‘…just so do these things through one another race/ and, roaming, visit other 
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the new reading is significant, but then fall short on specifics, whether textual or 
doctrinal. 17  For clarity, my objections do not stem from any opposition to the 
philosophical implications sometimes drawn from the ‘we’, since I am convinced of 
the unity of Empedocles’ though and his belief in reincarnation. But Empedocles can 
                                                                                                                                                              
places constantly;/ we do not reach the middle place in union.” Primavesi 
(2008)/(2011): “Genauso verhalten sich all diese (Elemente), nachdem sie 
durcheinandergelaufen sind,/ und jedes hat, abgeschlagen, einen anderen, ihm 
eigentümlichen Ort inne:/ Wir kommen ja noch nicht im geringsten in die mittleren 
(Orte) um ein einziges zu sein.” Primavesi’s insertion of a negation in the opening 
supplement, ‘not yet going to the centre’ [οὐ δή πω] με̣σ̣άτους follows criticisms 
from Laks 2002, 135-6, but this makes the two lines redundant while destroying the 
BA poetic pattern: the elements wander from the centre (1.286) and we (the elements 
(!)) do not go to the centre (1.287).  
17 M-P 214 first defended it as a reference to transmigrating daimones, perhaps to be 
identified as souls or Love particles, but Primavesi later dropped it after the criticisms 
in Laks 2002. Primavesi 2008, 47-57, 2008a and 2013 identifies ‘we’ as the elements 
and rejects the exile of the soul from the poem as a myth; on the three ‘we’s see 
below. Others do not produce a text or fail to make explicit the doctrinal connection, 
if any, between ‘we’ and cosmic middle spaces. Sedley, 2007, 70-71 for instance 
does not analyze I.287 but relies on the debatable claims that we live in the age of 
increasing Love, and that the corrections represent a fiddling of the books by one 
party seeking to suppress the former. Against this, see now Mansfeld and Algra 2008, 
discussed below. Inwood 2009, 242 in turn defends the ‘we’s as philosophically 
significant but merely translates the securely attested portions of I.287, without 
offering any account of the line’s meaning.  
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tell us a story about us and our place in the cosmos without them.18  Almost as 
suspicious is that three lines later, at I.290, the cosmic unification of the elements is 
described in the third person, as impersonally as ever, and without any mention of 
‘we’. Nor can the ‘we’ be squared with I. 285 [ὣς δ’α]ὔτ̣ως which shows that the two 
following lines are summing up earlier cosmological content.    
Second, now in a more positive vein, the suggestion of a first-hand error in 
the middle gap is palaeographically plausible, since we have an epsilon followed by a 
lunate sigma. The uncorrected first draft of the line may well have looked like 
this: ]ΜϵΤΑΤΟΥϹΤ[ϹΥΝϵ]ΡΧΟΜϵΘϵΝ[ .19 Nor, in so far as we are dealing with a lacuna, 
can it be disproved that the suggested reading was not corrected by the first or second 
hand, as occurs in the preceding word, where με̣σ̣ατους is a supra lineam correction 
of an original με̣τ̣ατους. Third, the triple ‘τε’s, taken together, explain and correlate 
the meaning of the ‘running through each other’ of I.285: sometimes it is the result of 
the separation of Strife into ‘other and other’ places, and sometimes it is the result of 
the elements returning to the centre.20 Fourth and last, the formulaic nature of the 
                                                        
18 Trépanier 2014.  
19 Or this: ]ΜϵΤΑΤΟΥϹ[ΤϵΥΝϵ]ΡΧΟΜϵΘϵΝ[. Perhaps the supra linear correction of ΜϵΤΑ 
distracted the first hand. M-P originally postulated a similar omission by haplography 
at d 8, reading λόγων <σ᾽> ἐπιβήσομεν’ αὖθις following the second hand’s 
correction of the first hand’s ἐπιβήσομεθ᾽  αὖθις.  
20 On three ‘τε’s, cf. I.269 ἐξ ὧν πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔσθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἔσσετ’ ὀπίσσω. 
The second τε, suggested by the extant first, is compatible with the traces, including a 
possible downward swivel at the left top of the τ as part of the ligature the scribe 
favours between ϹΤ, visible in the next line at με̣σ̣άτούς τ[̣ . The third, restored τε at 
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phrase makes both corrections defensible. To use an analogy, imagine the same 
scenario in a papyrus of the Iliad. Where a papyrus gap would not allow enough 
letters for the supplement of an established Homeric formula, one otherwise indicated 
from the extant portions of the text, no one would hesitate to infer a scribal error or 
initial copying slip inside the lacuna. Our passage, I suggest, is the Empedoclean 
equivalent of such a situation. The only difference is that we do not have enough 
Empedocles to be certain of the regularity of the formula. Or maybe we do: this leads 
me to ‘we’. 
 
3. ‘WE’ AND THE LITERARY UNITY OF I.232-292 
 
The three thetas 
In the short life of the ‘new Empedocles’, the biggest textual surprise in the 
papyrus has been the occurrence of the variant reading συνερχόμεθα ‘we come 
together’ in two or perhaps three instances of the papyrus, where our previous 
knowledge of the text would have led us to expect the neuter plural participle 
συνερχόμενα ‘coming together’ (references in note 1). Before the papyrus 
συνερχόμενα was the only known version of a recurrent Empedoclean poetic 
formula, as attested through the entire indirect tradition, mainly via Aristotle, 
Theophrastus and Simplicius. It is used by Empedocles to describe the unification or 
‘coming together’ of the elements under Love, where it is usually paired with a line 
devoted to the activity of Strife, in an AB pattern, for example at I.238-9/ B 17.8-9: 
                                                                                                                                                              
I.287 divides the line at the feminine caesura favoured by Empedocles. The caesura 
seems to be the motivation for Primavesi’s 2011 τι in με̣σ̣άτους τ[̣ι ἐσε]ρχ̣όμεθ’ . 
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ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰ ς ἓν ἅπαντα , 
ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει. 
 
In the papyrus, the new variants in the formula are found at: 
 
a (i) 6/I. 267  [                συνερχό]μεθ’ εἰ ς ἕνα κόσμον 
a(ii) 17/I.287 [         ]με̣σ̣άτούς τ[̣ . . . ε]ρχ̣όμεθ’ ἕν μ[̣όνον εἶ ναι.]  
c 3/I.303        [               συν]ερχόμεθ’ ε[ἰ ς ἕν ἅπαντα.  
 
At a (i) 6/I.267, however, a susperscript Ν above the theta by the second hand 
corrects this back to the Simplician variant, while at c 3, despite a small gap, the 
traces of a similar N are clear, now between two dots. On general grounds, the 
convergence of the second hand, who certainly had access to the whole text, and 
more likely than not other copies (why not?), and the general Simplician tradition at 
both I.267/ a (i) 6 and c 3 are weighty considerations in favour of the participle, and 
are supported by the fact that even though it is the more familiar reading to us, 
συνερχόμεν’ is in fact the lectio difficilior. For I. 267 as argued above, since B 26 
keeps the participle, this suggests that the text of I. 267 that Simplicius had before 
him had the participle. Against this, M-P, Janko and then Primavesi (2008) (2011) 
and (2013), maintain that the combination of the three new readings are too unlikely 
to have been accidental and must go back to the original. But if so, what were the 
motives for the second hand’s corrections? If we exclude the more obvious motive 
(the corrections are inferences from the grammar of the full text or, better still, based 
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on collation with a second text), we are left with no grounds for the nu’s, except to 
posit an ancient conspiracy (see n. 17).   
Now, on the second hand’s motives, Mansfeld and Algra have shown (2008 p. 
326), that there exists a positive ancient parallel for giving a passage more immediacy 
by reformulating it from the third to the first person. At a minimum, this renders 
moot the claim that we can discern the philosophical motives of whoever wrote nu’s 
over thêtas. Or at least, as conspiracy theories go, the notion that someone with a 
philosophical agenda tried to make the text more vivid and relevant by introducing 
the thêtas is inherently more plausible (and now supported) than that someone tried 
to make it more bland and impersonal by suppressing them.  
But if we dispense with conspiracy theories, where then did the thêtas 
originate? Something altogether less sinister may be at play. As suggested by 
Osborne (2000) in her initial review of M-P, the first hand may have thought that 
*συνερχόμεν was a solecism for the indicative middle form συνερχόμεθα, and 
having made the wrong diagnosis once, went on to change it mechanically thereafter. 
The second hand either knew better or was able to check the reading in another 
manuscript or both. In textual matters, a dumb mistake is still often the best —
because simplest— explanation. Thus, while Osborne remained agnostic, I still 
follow the stronger line advocated by Algra and Mansfeld (2001 and 2008) and 
myself (2003), to correct all of the new readings back to the participle, including the 
uncorrected a (ii) 17/I.287. In this case, that means doing so even at the price of 
positing an error within the lacuna at that line. To say this, of course, is not to deny 
that elsewhere in his poem Empedocles could have used the indicative form 
συνερχόμεθα. In end, the decisive point remains that in each of the three instances, 
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considered separately, the participle produces a better reading.21 As to why a (ii) 
17/I.287 was not corrected, we can just as easily imagine that the second hand caught 
two of these, I.267 and c 3, but simply missed the third, a common occurrence in 
papyri, even of the highest quality.22  
                                                        
21 Contra Primavesi 2013 718: ‘Doch ist der Indikativ syntaktisch an allen drei 
Stellen dem in diesen Formeln sonst gebräunchlichen Partizip συνερχόμεν’ (B17.7, 
B 26.5) eindeutig vorzuziehen.’ Yet in all three cases he has to resort to special 
pleading. In 1.267, ‘we’ are elements, ‘wie (Elementen)’ and κόσμον means the 
Sphere, not plural individuals (as also according to him at B 26.5). At 1.287 ‘we’ are 
also elements, despite the non-sequitur it produces and the destruction of the AB 
poetic formula. At 1.303 ‘we’ are elements again (now ‘Sphairosglieder’), despite the 
fact that, grammatically, the participle is fully protected by με̣λέων ... ὄγκον in I.302 
and γυῖ α in I.304 and that from the context it is clear that biological processes are 
being discussed, see Gemelli Marciano 2005. The philosophical implications of this 
systematic identification of ‘we’ with the elements cannot be considered here.   
22  To posit an uncorrected slip is not uncommon, yet keeping the ‘we’ involves 
overruling three corrections, two of which cohere with the Simplician tradition. That 
in fact is the bold textual move, especially where viable alternatives exist. But the 
track record of the second hand, so far as we can judge on the basis of a partial text, 
is fairly good. Ignoring un-noted errors, of nine positive interventions (a (i) 6, a (i) 8, 
c 3, c 4, d 5, d 10, d 15, d 18) perhaps only one is demonstrably false, d 10: 
ἐπιβήσομεθ᾽  1st hand, 2nd hand ἐπιβήσομεν᾽  requires an emendation to be kept, 
<σ’> ἐπιβήσομεν᾽ . I wonder if it is a hypercorrection prompted by the other ‘we’s. 
For an argument against the correction, see Nünlist’s 2005, 84-5. Three of them, by 
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The literary Unity of I.232-90 
 I now come to the final argument for my reconstruction. The argument flows 
from the general stylistic and argumentative features of the passage, which also 
strongly indicate unity or continuity from I.232 to I.290.  
If we consider the literary structure of I.232 to I.290, we can see that the 
whole section is organized around a single, unified design and that Empedocles used 
a deliberate method of exposition over these 58 lines of text. The most obvious 
feature of our passage, as noted by all commentators of B 17, is that within it 
Empedocles repeats himself several times. This, as noted by Graham 1988, is an 
effective way for him of not only to describe his doctrine of a cosmic cycle, but of 
enacting it before the hearer.  
But that is not all, for Empedocles does not merely repeat himself. With each 
iteration, he offers the hearer a fuller or rather more refined picture. The main 
structural feature allowing us to note these shifts is a recurring poetic formula, 
usually in the same AB format, in which two lines are devoted to the symmetrical 
operations of Love and Strife over the elements. Love or unity stands in the first line, 
with Strife or separation and many in the second (as noted above, Line I.287 is an 
                                                                                                                                                              
contrast, are obviously right (a (i) 8, c 4 and d 5), and if I am right about the ‘we’s, 
that would make five of them. The use of dots may indicate collation, and M-P, 22-25 
suggested that ensemble d, which alone has them, was from a different book, which 
was collated. On Janko’s reconstruction, however, the dots simply start at his I.335/d 
5 without any discernable difference in practice or intent. Though much remains 
unclear, on the whole the second hand seems worthy of more respect than he has 
been given.  
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instance of the A formula, but in a BA pattern). Starting with an enigmatic or 
compressed version of his main theme at I.232-3, Empedocles refines it via repetition 
and gradual elaboration, with variation provided by inserting various comments 
between the repetitions, either supporting arguments or entailments of the thesis just 
asserted, or in one case a short hymn to Love. Thus, the alternation of ‘one and many’ 
is first described (I.232-3) at its most general or abstract level. The next iteration of 
the theme (I.245-51) now relates unity with Love, while many or ‘more’ [than one] 
with Strife, but it does not yet mention the elements. The third iteration repeats 
verbatim the first statement of the alternation of one and many, but now names all six 
first principles (the four named elements (I.249); Strife (I.250) and Love (I.251)). 
Overall, the net effect is a gain in clarity: in a first transition the two moving or 
motivational forces are distinguished from the more material elements (from 1st to 
2nd statement), then in a second shift each of the four elements are distinguished (2nd 
to 3rd). And now, as revealed by the papyrus, —provided we read the participle at 
I.267— we have a fourth iteration (1.267-8) which repeats the theme of alternation, 
but now reveals the first principles as the sources for ‘everything’, and caps the claim 
with a zoogonic catalogue of known biological species, including ‘long-lived’ gods.  
In cinematographic terms, the passage is the equivalent of a long ‘zoom in’ 
shot. Starting from an abstract account, Empedocles returns to and gradually refines 
the same notion until, by way of a final development or ‘unfolding’, the known world 
suddenly emerges into view. In this his style can be considered a hexameter version 
of Aeschylus’ ‘proleptic’ or developmental presentational style, with a probable 
precedent for both in Heraclitus.23 Explicit acknowledgement of this presentational 
aspect is found elsewhere in the corpus, for instance in B 21.1-2, where Empedocles 
                                                        
23 Kahn 1979; Mouraviev 2002.  
 31 
tells the disciple that he is adding ‘witnesses’ or further details to his prior account, or 
in B 35.1-2, where he declares that he is ‘drawing upon’ an earlier account, nearly 
certainly the final three lines of our passage.  
How then does this relate to lines I.286-7?  Because, if the attribution of such 
a mode of exposition to Empedocles is correct, then the reconstruction of the text of 
I.273-87 shows how the AB pattern marked at lines I.267-8 is not the end-point of 
Empedocles’ ‘zoom in’ shot. Following the zoogonic catalogue, we get still more 
detail, in the form of the assertion that the relation between the elements and place is 
random within the cycle and from one cosmos to the next. That, as I have tried to 
show above, is the point of lines I.273-84. Following it, Empedocles then sums up the 
subsection on place and the elements by describing the two main types of global 
elemental movement, centrifugal Strife (I.286) and centripetal Love (I.287). Lastly, 
over lines I.288-9, he specifies the moment of turn-over between the two motive 
powers: when Love has retreated back to the centre of the whirl, and Strife has 
extended his dominion as far as down as he is allowed, that is when Love returns to 
the elements and stable mixtures.24 Thus, the final lines provide exactly the same 
kind of increasing detail and elaboration of cosmological doctrine we have found 
going all the way from I.232, with a final repetition of the —here— BA pattern of 
lines coordinated with Love and Strife at I.286-7. Unlike the non-sequitur presented 
by the ‘we’ reading, the lines now follow perfectly naturally from the previous ones, 
by adding the moment of transition from one type of movement to the next. Despite 
the unhappy accidents found in the first hand’s copy, Empedocles’ ‘organic’ poetic 
                                                        
24 Might the ‘we’ of συνερχόμεθα not then count as an elaboration and variation 
from συνερχόμεν(α)? Not according to the second hand at B 20/ensemble c 3, nor 
fragments B 21 and B 26 from Simplicius. 
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design, like some form of self-correcting DNA, shows us the way to repair the 
accidents of its own transmission. 25 
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